

Comparison of the Findings and Recommendations  
of the  
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations  
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs  
with the  
Recommendations of the DoD Security Review Commission

COMMITTEE FINDING

RELATED COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

1. Detection of security risks.

7. Single-scope BI.
8. Expanded investigating requirements for SECRET clearance
10. Greater access to state/local criminal history data.
13. Increased priority to periodic investigations.
14. Continuing discretionary authority to use CI-scope polygraph.
15. Institute formal cryptographic access program, including random polygraph. (Adopted)
16. Increased reporting of security-related information about DoD contractors.
17. "Reliability" program for persons with TOP SECRET/sensitive program access.
18. Increased reporting of possible espionage activity (e.g., "hotline").
19. Authority to reward persons who provide information about espionage activity.
20. Greater access to public record criminal data.
38. Increased counterintelligence analysis.
41. Increased reporting of foreign contacts.
42. Increased reporting of unofficial foreign travel.
43. Use of passive sources to report possible espionage.
44. Entry/exit searches of personal effects.
45. Reporting of chronic security violators.
47. Referral of persons who commit serious security violations.
49. Action against DoD employees who violate security.

2. Reduce numbers of cleared personnel.

1. Establish TOP SECRET billet control program.
2. Prohibit clearances for area access only.
3. Greater justification for contractor clearances.
4. Discourage clearance "stockpiling".
5. One-time, short-term access to next higher security level.

On file OSD release instructions apply.

COMMITTEE FINDINGRELATED COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

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| <p>3. Improve classification management.</p> <p>4. NSC review of personnel security programs.</p> <p>5. Personnel security oversight executive body; uniform investigative/adjudicative standards; formal training for investigators/adjudicators.</p> <p>6. Improved handling of classified information by Congress.</p> <p>7. Improved investigations for SECRET clearance.</p> <p>8. Periodic reinvestigations of holders of TOP SECRET and SECRET clearances.</p> <p>9. Emphasis on sanctions against DoD contractors who violate security.</p> | <p>21. Require challenges to suspected improperly classified information.</p> <p>7. DCI/OPM consent to single-scope BI for TOP SECRET and SCI. (Interim action)</p> <p>7. Single-scope BI for TOP SECRET/SCI. (DoD only)</p> <p>11. Revise adjudicative criteria (DoD only).</p> <p>12. Limited consolidation of DoD adjudicative functions.</p> <p>59. Security-related training (DoD only).</p> <p>60. Training for DoD and contractor security personnel. (DoD only)</p> <p>61. Certification of security personnel. (DoD only)</p> <p>25. Support to Congress in handling classified information.</p> <p>6. Restrictions on access to classified information for naturalized citizens, immigrant aliens and foreign nationals.</p> <p>8. Expanded investigative requirements for SECRET clearance.</p> <p>10. Greater access to state/local criminal data.</p> <p>13. Reinvestigations for holders of SECRET clearance.</p> <p>20. Greater access to criminal justice information.</p> <p>7. Single-scope BI for TOP SECRET/SCI access.</p> <p>8. Expanded investigatory requirements for SECRET clearance.</p> <p>10. Greater access to state/local criminal history data.</p> <p>13. Clear backlog of TS/SCI PRs by 1990; PRs of holders of SECRET clearance on case-basis; PRs for holders of SECRET clearance by 1995.</p> <p>16. Allow employees of DoD contractors to review security-related personal information submitted by employees.</p> <p>20. Greater access to criminal justice information.</p> <p>4.c. "Stockpiling" of security clearances by contractors to be a major security deficiency.</p> <p>18. Alternate methods of reporting security/espionage information (e.g., security "hotline")</p> <p>46. Legislation to enhance criminal action against civilian violators.</p> |
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COMMITTEE FINDING

10. Access to state/local government and private corporations' data for investigative purposes.
11. Interagency group to improve investigations of foreign-born candidates for security clearance.
12. Increased personnel security research.
13. Limitations on the Merit System.
14. Preventing unauthorized duplication/removal of classified documents through technology.
15. Continuing security awareness programs for federal and contractor employees.

RELATED COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

49. Contractors' administrative action against security violators.
50. Withholding of payments to contractors not in compliance with security regulations.
51. Revocation of facility clearance of contractors out of compliance.
10. Access to state/local criminal history data for investigative purposes.
20. Access to public record criminal justice information and other security-pertinent data banks.
6. Restrictions on access of naturalized citizens, immigrant aliens and foreign nations to classified information.
8. Expanded investigative basis for SECRET clearances.
10. Greater access to state/local criminal history data.
20. Access to public record criminal justice information and other federal data bases (e.g., INS, passport, etc.)
27. Computer security research
38. Greater counter-intelligence analysis.
58. DoD security research program.
- No comparable Commission recommendation.
23. Greater controls over reproduction equipment.
44. Entry/exit searches of personal belongings
58. DoD security research program
15. Cryptographic access program
38. Counterintelligence analysis
39. Evaluation of hostile intelligence operations.

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COMMITTEE FINDING

RELATED COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

16. Consolidation of industrial adjudication functions.

17. Possible removal of security costs from contract overhead as incentive for contractors to practice good security.

18. DIS/OMB investigators' access to NCIC data base.

19. Emphasis on "need-to-know" in requesting security clearances.

20. Contracting-out of security investigations.

40. Increased industry security awareness program.

59. Training for DoD persons assigned to security duties.

60. Training for contractor employees assigned to security duties.

11. Revise security clearance criteria.

33. Revised Special Access Program procedures.

4. Expeditious restoral of facility and employee security clearances.

49. Greater contractor enforcement of security requirements.

50. Withholding of payments to contractors who did not comply with security rules.

51. Revocation of facility clearance for serious lack of security responsibility.

10. Access by state/local criminal history information.

20. Access to public record criminal justice information.

1. Billet control system for TOP SECRET and SI clearances.

2. Prohibition against security clearance solely for access to areas containing classified information.

3. Greater justification for contractor clearances.

4. Rapid reinstatement of facility and personal security clearances.

5. One-time, short-term access to next higher lead of classified information.

34. Amendments to National Disclosure Policy.

No specific recommendation, but the following relate to reducing/reapportioning the investigative task:

1. Billet control system for TOP SECRET/SCI clearances.

2. Prohibition against clearances solely for access to classified areas.

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COMMITTEE FINDING

RELATED COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

21. Increased staffing for DoD personnel security program.

22. Implementation of recommendations by DoD Industrial Security Review Committee.

- 3. Greater justification for contractor clearances.
- 4. Reinstatement of personal security clearances.
- 5. One-time, short-term access to the next higher level of classified information.
- 7. Single-scope BI for access to TOP SECRET/SCI.
- 8. Expansion of investigation basis for SECRET clearance.
- 13. Greater priority to periodic re-investigations.
- 58. Security research program.

- 53. Review of OSD responsibilities for security matters.
- 56. Augmentation of OSD security organizations.
- 58. DoD security research program.

The following Commission recommendations incorporate partially or completely recommendations of the DoD Industrial Security Review (Harper) Committee:

- 3. Greater specificity of contractors' need for security clearances.
- 4. Prohibition against "stockpiling" of security clearances.
- 5. One-time, short-duration access to next level of security information.
- 8. Expanded investigatory requirements for SECRET clearance.
- 9. Interim SECRET clearances.
- 10. Revised adjudicative criteria.
- 13. Greater emphasis on periodic re-investigation, including SECRET clearances.
- 16. Contractor employee to serve as Government "agents" in screening of security clearance data.
- 18. Security "hotline".
- 19. Rewards for information about espionage.
- 23. Controls over reproduction equipment.
- 33. Cadre of DIS inspectors for Special Access Programs.

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COMMITTEE FINDING

RELATED COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

40. Enhanced industrial security awareness program.
41. Reporting of contacts with foreign nations.
42. Reports of unofficial foreign travel.
43. Use of passive sources to detect espionage.
45. Report of chronic security violators.
46. Enactment of criminal legislation against civilians who improperly disclose classified information.
49. Contractor actions against security violators.
50. Withholding of payments to gain compliance with classified contracts.
51. Revocation of security clearance for lack of security responsibility.
58. Security research program.
59. Training for DoD Security personnel.
60. Training for contractor security personnel.
61. Certification of security personnel.